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Good morning everyone. 
 
I would first like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the organisers and scientific 
committee of this Conference for giving me this wonderful opportunity to 
speak to you all at these seminars on a topic that is particularly dear to me 
and also the main subject of my Ph.D. thesis, which I will tell you about 
shortly. 
The institute of citizenship was traditionally conceived as an inclusion or 
exclusion factor in the relationship between citizens and foreigners with 
regard to entitlement to rights. It plays a vital historical role in family matters 
and, more generally, in matters relating to the civil status of people. This 
arises out of the idea that a national court is best suited to rule on such 
notions for reasons of cultural or spiritual affinity. 
In Italy, the criterion of citizenship was rigorously and forcefully advocated by 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini from the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Mancini directly inspired the first uniform code of law with regard to both the 
range of jurisdiction and determination of applicable law by Italian courts and 
the Italian legislature has always remained true to his teachings. Not even the 
study Committee on Law 218/1995 gave any serious consideration to 
reviewing this criterion. 
The criterion of citizenship has therefore held firm as a fundamental factor 
even though certain far from irrelevant changes have been introduced in 
practice. In procedural terms, a defendant's Italian citizenship is not in itself a 
general entitlement to jurisdiction (compare Article 3, paragraph I of the 1995 
law with Article 4 of the 1940 Code of Civil Procedure) yet still retains an 
extremely important role in special rules covering the many issues involved in 
personal status, as we will see shortly. Subsidiary criteria have been 
introduced in terms of the applicable law: examples include relationships 
between spouses of different nationalities, which are now subject to the law of 
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the State where they mainly conduct their married life. Several doctrinal 
questions have been raised over whether a more comprehensive reworking is 
justified based on the current situation, experience built up on the basis of the 
Brussels and Rome Conventions and European Union actions on private 
international law. 
With this in mind, a review of our adherence to Mancini's principals is not only 
prompted by the European Union experience – on which subject we need only 
mention that "any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited" 
(Article 18 TFUE) – but also the extensive development of national laws on 
citizenship, beginning with Italian law. Compared to many States, citizenship 
is losing its ability to express an individual's emphatic membership of the 
community of people who make up a State’s social base. In the not-so-distant 
past, the vast majority of national lawmakers aimed to avoid situations of dual 
nationality. The Council of Europe Convention – 6 May 1963 – on the 
Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases 
of Multiple Nationality was a clear expression of this approach. For present 
purposes, this Convention surprisingly did not undergo radical changes in 
accordance with the second Protocol of Amendment, opened for signature in 
Strasbourg on 2 February 1993 and ratified by Italy. As in the law on Italian 
citizenship, many foreign laws provided that, on marriage, a wife should take 
on her husband's nationality, losing her own original nationality and only the 
father was able to pass on his nationality to their children. 
Today the need to respect equality between men and women has led to a 
radical about-turn. Many legal systems, beginning with the Italian system, 
facilitate the passing-on of nationality to a foreign spouse by either husband or 
wife and allow both the father and the mother to pass on their nationality to 
their children. This is done regardless of any social or political integration. 
It must also be said that Italy is no longer the country of great emigration that 
it used to be in Mancini’s time and remained for many years after. Now 
exactly the opposite is true and in recent decades it has become the 
destination of significant flows of migrants who flock in from States with very 
different cultures to our own. This means that Italian courts are often faced 
with difficulties that can only be overcome by stretching public order to its 
limits. Even in the knowledge that loyalty to Mancini, in other words the 
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criterion of citizenship, can be more respectful to the original cultural identity 
of foreigners when faced with the problem of migration, the majority doctrine 
nevertheless inclined towards an idea of "betrayal", not merely to bring ‘forum’ 
into line with ‘jus', and hence the application of Italian substantive law in our 
courts, but also because this would make it possible to follow the prevailing 
attitude in uniform international private law. As early as the Hague Convention 
of 1902 on the guardianship of infants, the criterion of habitual residence 
appeared as an antithesis to the criterion of citizenship, replacing the more 
traditional criterion of domicile, upon the suggestion of the Italian delegate 
Augusto Pierantoni, who was incidentally Mancini's son-in-law. The 
connecting factor of habitual residence as it relates to different individuals and 
situations is now used by EU Regulations of 2007 and 2008 concerning the 
law applicable to non-contractual and contractual obligations respectively and 
is also destined to play an essential role with regard to the law governing 
succession due to death. 
The crux of the problem is therefore the relationship between a concept that 
relates mainly to the political matrix of State – citizenship – and connecting 
factors that lay more emphasis on an individual's proximity, in a topographical 
sense, to the States emanating the rules applicable to the legal situations 
involved. The EU concept of habitual residence is different from that of 
residence defined by paragraph II of Article 43 of the Italian Civil Code – 
which locates it "in the place where the person has their regular abode" – and 
is essentially closer to the notion of domicile, which paragraph I of the same 
Article 43 states is the main place where a person “takes care of his affairs 
and interests". 
It would therefore be useful to update Italian rules of international private law 
to replace the connecting factor of citizenship with that of habitual residence, 
in line with European Union policies. This would align Italian international 
private law with uniform systems of international private law that are already in 
force or in the process of adoption, depending on areas of interest. 
Under EU individual and family law, the nationality of spouses has retained an 
entirely marginal role as a connecting factor. 
Only two of the seven criteria of jurisdiction laid down in Article 3 of 
Regulation No 2201/2003 actually refer to nationality. In one case (Article 
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3(a), final indent), nationality coincides with habitual residence in determining 
jurisdiction. In the other case, nationality performs the independent function of 
identifying legal entitlement, but this is possible only where it is common 
between the spouses. 
In other words, the nationality of only one of the two spouses no longer makes 
it possible to identify any genuine connection with the territory of a Member 
State, unless it is reinforced by an additional territorial factor (habitual 
residence) or is specifically common to both spouses. The earlier Community 
system and now the European Union system therefore consecrated the 
transition from a concept of nationality as an element that was absolute and 
sufficient for the identification of jurisdiction to a concept of qualified 
nationality, in other words backed by an additional element capable of 
guaranteeing the authenticity of the identified connection. 
Over and above these cases, nationality in its classical sense retains a 
residual area of application in cases not covered by the courts of any EU 
Member State where it is therefore necessary for a respondent to avail 
himself – as provided for in Article 7 of Regulation 2201/2003 – of national 
exorbitant jurisdictions. 
As these examples show, citizenship has cast off its mantle as a criterion of 
direct competence but still has a direct impact on the sphere of jurisdiction, 
guaranteeing Member State nationals a privileged position. More specifically, 
"EU" citizenship – in other words nationality of a Member State – now acts as 
a privileged jurisdictional element, both in a positive sense – by ensuring 
national courts can be used by citizens of other Member States – and also in 
a negative sense – by limiting the scope of national exorbitant jurisdictions to 
non-EU citizens or those who do not have their habitual residence within the 
EU. European Union citizenship has also been at the heart of another recent 
judgement handed down by the Court of Justice, in the Zambrano case. 
According to the spirit of EU law, common nationality was intended to 
guarantee a genuine and real connection with the situation, avoiding the 
creation of exorbitant jurisdictions associated with the citizenship of only one 
of the spouses. Even common nationality does not actually always guarantee 
a sufficiently well-defined connection since it could well be the case that 
spouses of the same nationality have stably and permanently relocated their 
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married life to a different country and thus most of the elements of the case in 
point will relate to this State. 
The choice of the EU lawmaker is therefore aimed at providing a 
"supplementary" EU jurisdiction if the main jurisdictions based on the habitual 
residence of the spouses (or one of the spouses) are insufficient to locate the 
jurisdiction within EU territory. For example, if a couple of EU citizens of the 
same nationality who have lived out their entire married life in a non-EU state, 
their EU citizenship acts as an "extreme" criterion that is used to reclaim and 
incorporate certain situations that would otherwise not be destined to have 
any connection with the EU within the scope of EU rules. This approach 
opens up the possibility of one or both spouses petitioning their own national 
courts for the dissolution of their marriage when they return to their own 
States after the marriage breakdown. 
One such example is provided by a case recently ruled on by the Cour de 
Cassation, which held that the French court had jurisdiction based on Article 
3(b), even if all elements of the marriage were actually located in a different 
Country. 
Regulation 2201/2003 does not specify what happens if the spouses hold 
several nationalities or even if they hold more than one nationality in common. 
The rule of conflict between the different nationalities should therefore be 
sought in the national rules of conflict. In the case of the Italian legal system, 
this should lead to the application of Article 19, second paragraph of Law 
218/1995 which, in the event of conflict between nationalities, states that the 
one with a closer connection with the case should take precedence except in 
the case of conflict with Italian citizenship, in which case the latter takes 
precedence. In both cases, the application of Article 19, second paragraph is, 
however, at odds with the aim of EU law: Italian citizenship taking precedence 
over another EU citizenship could be at odds with the general prohibition 
imposed by EU law on discriminating on the basis of nationality and could 
ultimately be detrimental to the aim of uniform application of EU law. This 
would happen, for example, if two spouses were both Italian nationals and 
also had the nationality of another EU country. In this situation, the two 
"European" nationalities should clearly be seen as exactly equal and the 
national court must assess them as two mutually exclusive independent 
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jurisdictional entitlements with equal dignity. Cases of dual nationality are 
bound to increase as European society develops. The Court of Justice has 
ruled several times on this point, departing from the international principle of 
"effective" nationality. In order to exercise the freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty, the Court states that the legislation of a Member State may not limit 
the effects of granting citizenship of another Member State by imposing an 
additional condition for recognition of that citizenship (as occurred in the 
Micheletti and Garcia Avello judgements). 
This principle has also been clarified recently with reference to international 
private law, in a case regarding spouses who had both Hungarian and French 
citizenship and had filed two separate petitions for divorce, one with a 
Hungarian court and another with a French court: judgement of 16 July 2009, 
in the Hadadi case. In a case such as this, where there is a "perfect" conflict 
between two legal titles, the EU courts clarified that the "objective" rule of 
prevention applies, which in practice gives the jurisdiction to the first court 
seised. 
A different situation could apply in the case of conflict between an EU 
nationality and a non-EU nationality: in this case, the need to avoid situations 
of discrimination under EU law would no longer apply and the automatic 
precedence of national citizenship within the EU (as in the case of Article 19, 
second paragraph, final indent of Law 218/1995) could well be justified by the 
aim of ensuring the application of EU law as opposed to national exorbitant 
jurisdictions. 
In the same way, Article 19, second paragraph, first indent would not be 
applicable. As already stated, this establishes the precedence of the 
nationality that has a closer connection with the situation: the practical 
application of this subsidiary criteria would lead to a substantial distortion of 
the hierarchy between the legal titles referred to in Article 3 of Regulation No 
2201/2003. More specifically, this would mean relinquishing the criterion of 
nationality to effectively give hierarchical precedence to the criterion of 
habitual residence. In other words, in the economy of the judicial system 
outlined by the EU legislature, nationality has an absolute value that cannot 
be adapted in the light of the actual situation. The solution of literally 
interpreting Article 3(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003 is undoubtedly the most 
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appropriate, including in terms of predictability of the jurisdiction. If we 
interpret the criterion of nationality, avoiding any reference to rules of national 
conflict, but purely and simply applying the jurisdiction of the State of which 
both spouses are nationals, there is no doubt that the spouses will reasonably 
be able to predict the court to which they should submit their petition for 
dissolution of the marriage. This solution also offers the advantage of 
observing the principles laid down in Article 3(b) and, in general, the purpose 
of Regulation No 2201/2003 which, as already stated, is to facilitate 
dissolution of the marriage and allow the spouses to achieve this result in the 
simplest possible manner. 
Otherwise there would be a risk of making the application of EU rules subject 
to supplementary national criteria that would in practice bring about a different 
effect, which could potentially be at odds with the principles of EU law. 
We are nevertheless bound to ask whether the Court of Justice would reach 
the same conclusion as in the Hadadi case if the applicable law were 
observed: in other words, if the court hearing the case did not have to treat 
the laws of both the States of which the parties are nationals as though they 
were on the same level. Regulation No 2201/2003 does not contain provisions 
on the applicable law. The Proposal for a Regulation of 17 July 2006, revising 
the Brussels II bis Regulation, states with regard to the choice of applicable 
law that this should be dictated by compliance with the principle of "proximity". 
In the absence of choice, the legislature identifies successive criteria that 
recall "the law of the State of the habitual common residence of the spouses, 
or failing that of their last habitual residence if one of them still resides there or 
failing that of which both the spouses are nationals or…. failing that of the 
habitual residence of the defendant" (Article 20b). In the case of dual 
citizenship, the spouses could therefore choose to apply to the court of one of 
the two States of which they are nationals and to establish the law of another 
State of which they are nationals as the applicable law. In this case, following 
the reasoning of the Court, we cannot fail to conclude that the court applied to 
could not deny the application of the law of another Member State merely 
because the spouses had lived for many years in the State where the court is 
located. The independence of the parties takes precedence, provided the 
guidelines laid down in the Regulation are complied with. Greater 
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independence of the parties and the introduction of criteria such as habitual 
residence will certainly reduce problems associated with cases of dual 
citizenship. 
The recent "Rome III" Regulation (1259/2010) is certainly in line with the 
approach outlined by Regulation No 2201/2003 and also touched on by the 
enactment of Regulation No 4/2009 on maintenance obligations. This 
Regulation establishes reinforced cooperation within the scope of the law 
applicable to divorce and personal separation and is based on the 
acknowledgement that the spouses are bound to choose a jurisdiction that 
has a strong connection with their marriage. According to the Regulation 
(Article 8), this connection mainly consists of the common habitual residence 
of the spouses or the last habitual residence of the spouses if one of them still 
resides there, followed by the citizenship of one of the spouses and ultimately 
the ‘lex fori’. If no agreement is reached, the applicable law is determined on 
the basis of a set of objective connecting factors intended to ensure that the 
process of weakening or dissolving the bond is governed by a legal system 
with which the spouses have a close connection. In general, the Regulation 
gives precedence to the criterion of the habitual residence of the spouses at 
the time when the petition was filed with the judicial authority. The precedence 
accorded to the residence of the spouses over their nationalities is motivated 
by the advantages that this connecting factor offers over the criterion of their 
nationality. 
To conclude, the criterion of citizenship is losing its former strength and 
becoming an alternative or even a subsidiary criterion, giving way to other 
criteria that are more relevant to the current situation. Despite this, citizenship 
is not disappearing altogether: it now occupies a subordinate position to meet 
the unique needs of a diverse European society. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
